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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal from a decision of the Tax Court, we are 
asked to determine whether certain costs incurred by 
banks for marketing, researching and originating loans are 
deductible as "ordinary and necessary expenses" as 
provided by section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 
U.S.C. S 162 (1988), or whether these expenses must be 
capitalized under section 263 of the Code. Two banks that 
were predecessors in interest of appellant PNC Bancorp, 
Inc. deducted these costs as ordinary business expenses. 
The Internal Revenue Service disallowed the deductions and 
issued statutory notices of deficiency. PNC filed petitions for 
redetermination with the Tax Court. The Tax Court 
determined that the expenses in question were not 
deductible, but, instead, must be capitalized and amortized 
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over the life of the subject loans. PNC now appeals from 
this determination. 
 
We hold that the costs at issue were deductible as 
"ordinary and necessary" expenses of the banking business 
within the meaning of Internal Revenue Code section 162, 
and that these costs do not fall within the purview of 
section 263. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of 
the Tax Court. 
 
I. Genesis of the Dispute 
 
The costs that the banks seek to deduct are the internal 
and external costs that they incur in connection with the 
issuance of loans to their customers. These costs, 
discussed in more detail below, are a routine part of the 
banks' daily business, and the services procured with these 
outlays have been integral to the basic execution of the 
banking business for decades. 
 
The general contours of banks' involvement in making 
loans have not changed dramatically in recent years, and 
the relevant sections of the Tax Code have remained largely 
unchanged. Historically, the costs at issue have been 
deductible in the year that they are incurred; however, the 
Commissioner rejected this tax treatment by PNC. Why is 
the Commissioner now insisting upon capitalization of 
these costs? 
 
There are two relatively recent developments that appear 
to have emboldened the Internal Revenue Service to pursue 
capitalization of such costs. One of these developments is 
the Supreme Court's opinion in INDOPCO, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992), in which the Court held 
that expenses incurred by a target corporation in the 
course of its friendly acquisition by another entity were not 
currently deductible. See id. at 90. INDOPCO, which 
signaled that the Supreme Court's previously announced 
tests for capitalization were not exhaustive, may well have 
been viewed by the IRS as a green light to seek 
capitalization of costs that had previously been considered 
deductible in a number of businesses and industries. This 
phenomenon has not escaped comment from observers. 
See, e.g., W. Curtis Elliott Jr., Capitalization of Operating 
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Expenses After INDOPCO: IRS Strikes Again, S.C. Law., 
Sept./Oct. 1993, at 29, 29, 30 (commenting on the IRS's 
"recently aggressive posture on capitalization" after 
INDOPCO, and noting that while the INDOPCO  decision 
itself was not "necessarily troubling," the IRS's 
interpretation of it has stretched far beyond the scenario 
presented in INDOPCO); IRS Loses Battle in INDOPCO War: 
Advertising Remains Deductible, Taxes on Parade, July 16, 
1998, at 1 (describing the "IRS's INDOPCO-fueled 
juggernaut"). Thus, INDOPCO ushered in an era of generally 
more aggressive IRS pursuit of capitalization. 
 
An additional development may have prompted the IRS's 
assertive posture in the more specific case of the loan 
origination costs at issue here. This second development 
was the Financial Accounting Standards Board's 
promulgation of a new standard for financial accounting 
treatment of loan origination costs, Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards No. 91 ("SFAS 91").1 Beginning in the 
late 1980s, SFAS 91 required for the first time that, for 
financial accounting purposes, loan fee income and the 
costs incurred in connection with loan origination should 
be deferred and recognized over the life of the loan, rather 
than being recognized in full in the year the loan closed.2 
The FASB's authority extends only to financial accounting 
standards and not to tax accounting standards. For the 
first few years of SFAS 91's existence, the IRS did not 
require capitalization of the loan origination costs described 
in this financial accounting standard. However, the IRS 
apparently viewed INDOPCO as a reason to pursue 
capitalization of the costs that SFAS 91 requires to be 
deferred.3 Thus, the stage for this litigation was set. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") is an independent 
private sector organization that establishes standards for financial 
accounting and reporting. The Securities and Exchange Commission 
recognizes the FASB's financial accounting standards as authoritative. 
See UAW Local No. 1697 v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130, 136 n.4 
(3d Cir. 1999). 
 
2. SFAS 91 became effective for accounting years that began after 
December 15, 1987. 
 
3. Although the Commissioner and the Tax Court both claimed that they 
were not relying on the financial accounting standards of SFAS 91 in 
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II. Factual Background 
 
PNC Bancorp, Inc. (PNC) is a bank holding company 
incorporated in Delaware. See A. at 102. Two smaller 
banking entities, First National Pennsylvania Corporation 
(FNPC) and United Federal Bancorp, Inc. (UFB), were 
merged into PNC in 1992 and 1994, respectively, and PNC 
succeeded to the liabilities of both these companies. See A. 
at 103, 105. The activities at issue in this case occurred 
before the mergers and were performed by FNPC and UFB 
or their subsidiaries.4 
 
The costs challenged in this appeal were incurred by both 
banks in connection with the origination of loans. 5 There 
are two categories of such "loan origination costs," as they 
have been called.6 The first category includes payments 
made to third parties for activities that help the bank 
determine whether to approve a loan (credit screening, 
property reports, and appraisals) and for the recording of 
security interests when the bank decides to issue a secured 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
determining the tax treatment of the costs at issue, the IRS appears to 
have imported the result of these financial accounting standards into the 
tax arena without engaging in independent analysis of why these costs 
should be subject to different tax treatment than the majority of 
everyday business costs, and without considering the secondary tax 
ramifications that would flow from a requirement of capitalization. See 
infra note 16; see also Tr. of Oral Argument at 27 (conceding that SFAS 
91 effectively determined where the IRS would "draw the line" between 
deductibility and capitalization in this case). 
 
4. For FNPC, the tax years at issue are 1988 and 1990; for UFB, the 
years at issue are 1990, 1991, 1992 and 1993. 
 
5. The IRS contested FNPC's claimed deductions for origination of both 
consumer and commercial loans, but contested UFB's deductions only 
for costs incurred in originating consumer loans. See A. at 137. The Tax 
Court opinion noted that it was unclear why the IRS pursued 
commercial loan activities only in the case of one of the two banks. See 
PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 349, 355 n.9 (1998). 
 
6. The parties disagree as to the appropriate name for this collection of 
costs -- the Commissioner prefers "loan origination expenses," while PNC 
prefers "risk management and marketing costs." However, as there is no 
dispute about which costs are included in this group, the disagreement 
is largely semantic. In this opinion, we will use the terms "loan 
origination costs" or "loan marketing costs" to denote the costs at issue. 
 
                                6 
  
loan. The second category consists of internal costs, namely 
that portion of employee salaries and benefits that can be 
attributed to time spent completing and reviewing loan 
applications, and to other efforts connected with loan 
marketing and origination.7 The Commissioner pursued 
capitalization of loan origination costs only when those 
costs were incurred in connection with a loan that was later 
approved; the Commissioner allowed the banks to deduct 
origination costs expended in connection with loans that 
were not successfully approved. See PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 110 T.C. 349, 359, 362 (1998); see also Tr. 
of Oral Argument at 7. 
 
Loan interest constituted the largest source of revenue 
for each bank during the relevant time period, and interest 
on deposits and other borrowing constituted the largest 
expense. See A. at 108.8 It is undisputed that banks 
generally can be profitable only if they successfully manage 
their "net interest margin" -- the difference between 
interest earned and interest paid. A profitable bank's net 
interest margin plus its revenues from fees and other 
sources must exceed its losses on loans and investments. 
See A. at 108. 
 
Bank personnel routinely undertook loan marketing 
activities in tandem with other marketing and customer 
service functions. Both tellers and "platform employees" 
(those bank employees who have desks apart from the teller 
windows) were encouraged to "cross-sell," that is, to sell 
multiple products to existing and new customers who came 
to the bank in search of a particular product or service. For 
example, if a new customer opened a checking and savings 
account, the bank representative might also suggest a 
certificate of deposit or a loan. Likewise, when a consumer 
applied for a loan, the employee taking the application was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The parties have stipulated to most of the facts concerning the loan 
origination activities and the role that loan origination plays in the 
banking business. 
 
8. As the Tax Court put it, the banks' "principal businesses . . . 
consisted of accepting demand and time deposits and using the amounts 
deposited, together with other funds, to make loans." PNC, 110 T.C. at 
351. 
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also expected to sell other bank products and services 
(such as checking accounts, credit lines, or ATM cards) 
during that same session. The banks provided financial 
incentives to their tellers and platform employees for each 
successful "cross-sale," see A. at 110, and such "cross- 
sales" were a routine part of each bank's daily business.9 
 
Before 1988, FNPC and UFB treated their loan 
origination costs in the same manner as their other routine 
expenses, both for tax accounting and financial accounting 
purposes. That is, they reported these costs for the tax year 
(and the fiscal year) in which the costs were incurred. This 
practice was apparently standard in the banking industry 
at that time. See A. at 169. In 1988, following the 
promulgation of SFAS 91, FNPC and UFB began to separate 
out their loan origination costs for financial accounting and 
reporting purposes in order to conform with SFAS 91's 
requirements. However, both banks continued to deduct 
loan origination costs for tax purposes in the tax year in 
which the loan closed. See A. at 124, 134. It is these 
deductions that the Commissioner and the Tax Court 
disallowed. 
 
III. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
The Tax Court had jurisdiction over PNC's petitions for 
redetermination pursuant to 26 U.S.C. SS 6213 and 7442. 
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 
S 7482(a)(1), which states that "[t]he United States Courts of 
Appeals . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review the 
decisions of the Tax Court . . . in the same manner and to 
the same extent as decisions of the district courts in civil 
actions tried without a jury." Thus, we have plenary review 
over the Tax Court's findings of law, including its 
construction and application of the Internal Revenue Code. 
See National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Commissioner, 918 
F.2d 426, 428 (3d Cir. 1990), aff 'd, INDOPCO, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992). We review the Tax 
Court's factual findings and inferences for clear error. See 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. At UFB, the average number of products and services sold to a new 
customer at a loan session was six, including the loan. See A. at 53. 
 
                                8 
  
id.; see also Pleasant Summit Land Corp. v. Commissioner, 
863 F.2d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 
IV. Discussion 
 
There is a fundamental distinction between business 
expenses and capital outlays. The primary consequence of 
characterizing a payment as a business expense or a 
capital outlay "concerns the timing of the taxpayer's cost 
recovery," INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 83 
(1992): business expenses are deductible in the year in 
which they are incurred, whereas a capital outlay is 
generally "amortized and depreciated over the life of the 
relevant asset, or, where no specific asset or useful life can 
be ascertained, is deducted upon dissolution of the 
enterprise," id. at 83-84. 
 
Two sections of the Internal Revenue Code address the 
deductibility vel non of expenditures such as those incurred 
by FNPC and UFB. Section 162 of the Internal Revenue 
Code provides in pertinent part: "There shall be allowed as 
a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid 
or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade 
or business . . ." 26 U.S.C. S 162(a). Section 263 of the 
Code states that capital expenditures, i.e.,"amount[s] paid 
out for new buildings or for permanent improvements or 
betterments made to increase the value of any property or 
estate," cannot be currently deducted. 26 U.S.C.S 263(a)(1). 
It is true that these two sections are neither all-inclusive 
nor mutually exclusive. See General Bancshares Corp. v. 
Commissioner, 326 F.2d 712, 716 (8th Cir. 1964) (written 
by then-Judge Blackmun). For example, it is possible that 
an expense that might appear to be deductible under 
section 162(a) might instead be required to be capitalized 
because it also properly falls under the description provided 
by section 263(a). If an expense were to fall under the 
language of section 263(a), that section would "trump" the 
deductibility provision of section 162(a) and the expense 
would have to be capitalized. Thus, in order to be 
deductible, the expense must both be "ordinary and 
necessary" within the meaning of section 162(a) and fall 
outside the group of capital expenditures envisioned by 
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section 263(a).10 Nonetheless, the two sections represent the 
archetypes of the two opposing alternatives for tax 
treatment of expenditures -- deduction and capitalization 
-- and, ordinarily, an expenditure will fall under one or the 
other section, not both. 
 
The taxpayer bears the burden of showing that a given 
expenditure is deductible. See Interstate Transit Lines v. 
Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943), quoted in 
INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 84. In order to demonstrate 
deductibility under section 162(a) of the Code, the taxpayer 
must meet a five-part test. "To qualify as an allowable 
deduction under S 162(a) . . . , an item must (1) be `paid or 
incurred during the taxable year,' (2) be for `carrying on any 
trade or business,' (3) be an `expense,' (4) be a`necessary' 
expense, and (5) be an `ordinary' expense." Commissioner v. 
Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 352 (1971). It is 
clear that PNC's loan origination expenses can satisfy the 
first four parts of this test.11 The question before us under 
S 162, then, is whether these expenses qualify as "ordinary" 
business expenses within the meaning of that section. 
 
In determining what expenditures qualify as "ordinary," 
we must look to the particular facts of the case before us, 
including the particular puzzle posed by the circumstances 
of the banking industry. As Justice Cardozo stated nearly 
seventy years ago in interpreting an earlier version of this 
long-standing Code provision, ordinariness is "a variable 
affected by time and place and circumstance." Welch v. 
Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113-14 (1933). In interpreting the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Section 161 of the Code provides the appropriate method for reading 
the two provisions in sequence: "In computing taxable income [ ], there 
shall be allowed as deductions the items specified in this part, subject 
to the exceptions provided in part IX (sec. 261 and following, relating to 
items not deductible)." 26 U.S.C. S 161. Therefore, an expense that is 
judged ordinary and necessary under section 162 can be deducted only 
if it also does not trigger any of the capitalization provisions beginning 
in section 261. 
 
11. The requisite showing that an expense is"necessary" is a minimally 
burdensome one; to meet it, a taxpayer need show only that the 
expenditures were "appropriate and helpful." Welch v. Helvering, 290 
U.S. 111, 113 (1933) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 
316 (1819)). 
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Code, we should not stray from the moorings of the 
"natural and common meaning" of the term "ordinary," id. 
at 114, and in doing so must examine the nature of the 
day-to-day operations of the particular business being 
considered. See also Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 495- 
96 (1940) (stating that each case "turns on its special 
facts," and that an expense that is ordinary-- "normal, 
usual, or customary" -- in one business may not be 
ordinary in another). Justice Cardozo's oft-quoted words 
regarding the heavily case-specific nature of this inquiry are 
no less appropriate today than they were in 1933: 
 
       Here, indeed, as so often in other branches of the law, 
       the decisive distinctions are those of degree and not of 
       kind. One struggles in vain for any verbal formula that 
       will supply a ready touchstone. The standard set up by 
       the statute is not a rule of law; it is rather a way of life. 
       Life in all its fullness must supply the answer to the 
       riddle. 
 
Welch, 290 U.S. at 114-15; see also Commissioner v. Lincoln 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 353 (1971). Accordingly, 
we pursue a real-life inquiry into whether the expenditures 
associated with loan marketing and origination are 
"ordinary" expenses incurred in the day-to-day 
maintenance of a bank's business. 
 
The Commissioner has conceded that loan interest was 
the banks' largest revenue source during the period in 
question, and that interest payments on deposits and other 
borrowing were their largest expense. There is no reason to 
suppose that this time period was any different from any 
other in this regard. Further, maximizing the "net interest 
margin" -- the difference between interest received and 
interest paid out -- is the principal manner in which banks 
earn their keep. As the Tax Court stated, "[t]he principal 
businesses of [the banks] consisted of accepting demand 
and time deposits and using the amounts deposited, 
together with other funds, to make loans." PNC, 110 T.C. at 
351. Modern banks are essentially dealers in money. See 
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 326, 
327 n.5 (1963). 
 
Given this context, the ordinary nature of the costs at 
issue, routinely incurred in the banks' businesses, would 
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seem clear. In order to ensure deductibility, however, we 
must also ascertain whether these costs were expended for 
betterments to increase the value of property in a way that 
would require these costs' capitalization underS 263. We 
cannot conclude that in performing credit checks, 
appraisals, and other tasks intended to assess the 
profitability of a loan, the banks "stepped out of [their] 
normal method of doing business" so as to render the 
expenditures at issue capital in nature. Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, Inc. v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212, 217 (7th 
Cir. 1982). As we stated in National Starch, an important 
determination is whether given expenditures "relate to the 
corporation's operations and betterment into the indefinite 
future," indicating the need for capitalization, or are instead 
geared toward "income production or other current needs," 
suggesting deductibility. National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. 
Commissioner, 918 F.2d 426, 433 (3d Cir. 1990), aff 'd, 
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992). The 
facts before us demonstrate that loan operations are the 
primary method of income production for the subject 
banks. We have no doubt that the expenses incurred in 
loan origination were normal and routine "in the particular 
business" of banking. See Deputy v. du Pont , 308 U.S. at 
496. 
 
The Commissioner argues, and the Tax Court found, that 
the Supreme Court's decision in Lincoln Savings  requires a 
different result. We disagree. In Lincoln Savings, the 
Supreme Court concluded that payments made by Lincoln 
Savings and Loan Association into a "Secondary Reserve" 
fund at the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation (FSLIC) were not deductible as ordinary 
business expenditures. See Lincoln Savings, 403 U.S. at 
354, 359. In so holding, the Court upheld the IRS's 
distinction between payments that Lincoln made into the 
FSLIC's "Primary Reserve," which the IRS had found to be 
deductible as ordinary and necessary expenses, and those 
payments made into the "Secondary Reserve," found to be 
capital expenditures. The Court engaged in an extensive 
analysis of the nature of each reserve fund and the 
premium payments made into each by Lincoln Savings and 
other similarly situated FSLIC-insured institutions. The 
Court noted that the "only concern" was whether the 
 
                                12 
  
premium payment to the Secondary Reserve "was an 
expense and an ordinary one within the meaning ofS 162(a) 
of the Code." Lincoln Savings, 403 U.S. at 354. The Court 
noted that the fact that many institutions were required to 
make such a Secondary Reserve premium did not render 
that premium an ordinary expense, see id. at 358; nor did 
the fact that the premium could have some ensuing benefit 
to Lincoln Savings, in and of itself, render the premium a 
capital expenditure, see id. at 354 ("many expenses 
concededly deductible have prospective effect beyond the 
taxable year"). Rather, the Court focused on what the 
payment represented in the context of Lincoln Savings' 
business and of the "structure and operation of FSLIC's 
reserves": 
 
       What is important and controlling, we feel, is that the 
       [Secondary Reserve] payment serves to create or 
       enhance for Lincoln what is essentially a separate and 
       distinct additional asset and that, as an inevitable 
       consequence, the payment is capital in nature and not 
       an expense, let alone an ordinary expense, deductible 
       under S 162(a) in the absence of other factors not 
       established here. 
 
Id.12 Whereas Lincoln Savings and the other insured 
institutions had no property interest in the Primary 
Reserve, each did have an earmarked property interest in 
the Secondary Reserve that was carried as an asset on each 
institution's books, was enhanced by each institution's 
contribution, and was refundable to that institution in 
certain circumstances. 
 
In the case at bar, the Tax Court concluded without any 
elaboration that the consumer and commercial loans 
"clearly" were separate and distinct assets of the banks, see 
PNC, 110 T.C. at 364, and that the costs incurred in 
originating and processing the loans "created" these 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Interestingly, while the Court did not discuss the issue in terms of 
the provisions of S 263, in determining that the asset was "capital in 
nature," the Court necessarily engrafted its thinking on the meaning of 
capital assets under that section of the Code. In fact, the Supreme Court 
has subsequently described Lincoln Savings' holding as stemming from 
an analysis of S 263 as well as S 162. See INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 86-87. 
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separate and distinct assets, see id. at 366. We believe that 
the Tax Court took too broad a reading of what Lincoln 
Savings meant by "separate and distinct assets," as well as 
an overbroad reading of what can be said to "create" such 
assets. 
 
The Secondary Reserve fund in Lincoln Savings  was a 
"separate and distinct asset" in two important ways that 
distinguish it from FNPC's and UFB's loans, the assets in 
question here. First, the Secondary Reserve fund was an 
asset that existed quite apart from Lincoln's main daily 
business of taking deposits and making loans; second, the 
fund was an asset that, although it existed within the 
FSLIC, was nonetheless separate from the FSLIC's other 
revenues and distinctly earmarked as Lincoln's property. 
The Tax Court's broad reading of Lincoln Savings  essentially 
treats the term "separate and distinct asset" as if it extends 
to cover any identifiable asset. We do not subscribe to this 
reading of Lincoln Savings. 
 
Furthermore, we do not agree that the marketing and 
origination activities actually "created" the banks' loans in 
the same way that the activities in Lincoln Savings created 
the Secondary Reserve fund. In the instant case, the Tax 
Court proceeded from the clearly accurate premise that the 
expenses in question were associated with the loans, 
incurred in connection with the acquisition of the loans, or 
"directly related to the creation of the loans," PNC, 110 T.C. 
at 368, to the faulty conclusion that these expenses 
themselves created the loans. See id. at 364-68. We 
conclude that the term "create" does not stretch this far. In 
Lincoln Savings, it was the payments themselves that 
formed the corpus of the Secondary Reserve; therefore, it 
naturally follows that these payments "created" the reserve 
fund. In PNC's case, however, the expenses are merely 
costs associated with the origination of the loans; the 
expenses themselves do not become part of the balance of 
the loan. PNC argues persuasively that the Tax Court's 
interpretation of the Lincoln Savings language is 
inappropriately expansive: 
 
       While purporting to apply the Lincoln Savings  
       language, both the Tax Court and the government 
       effectively have transformed that language, by subtle 
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       but significant degrees, from a test based on whether 
       a cost "creates" a separate and distinct asset, into a 
       much more sweeping test that would mandate 
       capitalization of costs incurred "in connection with" or 
       "with respect to" the acquisition of an asset. 
 
PNC Reply Br. at 4. We decline to follow the Tax Court's 
broad interpretation, for to do so would be to expand the 
type of costs that must be capitalized so as to drastically 
limit what might be considered as "ordinary and necessary" 
expenses. We conclude, therefore, that the loan origination 
expenses were ordinary expenses and that they did not 
"create or enhance a separate and distinct asset" within the 
meaning of Lincoln Savings. 
 
A line of federal appellate opinions subsequent to Lincoln 
Savings, involving factual scenarios not that different from 
the one before us, supports our finding that Lincoln Savings 
does not compel a conclusion that FNPC's and UFB's costs 
should be capitalized. These cases, from the Fourth, Eighth 
and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals, address the 
deductibility of costs incurred in connection with credit 
card issuance. In Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. 
Commissioner, 592 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1979), the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals found that payments by banks to 
third parties who provided the banks with credit 
information on prospective credit card customers were 
deductible expenses under S 162. See id.  at 436. The court 
found that "[p]erhaps the most significant factor is that the 
payments were for a service (credit screening) that could 
have been performed by personnel employed by the 
[banks]." Id. Because "[c]redit screening is a necessary and 
ordinary part of the banking business . . . not a capital 
expenditure," the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found 
that fees paid to third parties for credit screening were 
deductible. Id. The Iowa-Des Moines court seemed to 
assume that such expenditures would a fortiori  be 
deductible if the bank's personnel were to perform the 
credit screens themselves.13 The Fourth and Tenth Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals also emphasized the "short 
useful life" of this credit information as a factor weighing in favor of 
deductibility. Iowa-Des Moines, 592 F.2d at 436. 
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Courts of Appeals have reached similar conclusions. In First 
National Bank of South Carolina v. United States, 558 F.2d 
721 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam), the Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals permitted the taxpayer bank to deduct start-up 
assessments paid to a nonprofit association formed to 
enable banks to combine their efforts in entering the credit 
card field. See id. at 723. The association was charged with 
centralizing billing and recordkeeping for the banks. The 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals characterized the credit 
card accounts that were the focus of this activity as being 
a type of loan. See id. at 722. In Colorado Springs National 
Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974), the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals allowed the deduction of 
pre-operation expenditures for a nonprofit credit card- 
related association that would cover expenses such as 
computer costs, advertising, credit screening, and clerical 
services. See id. at 1193. The Colorado Springs court found 
that these expenses did not "create or enhance . . . a 
separate and distinct additional asset," reasoning as 
follows: 
 
       The start-up expenditures here challenged did not 
       create a property interest. They produced nothing 
       corporeal or salable. They are recurring. At the most 
       they introduced a more efficient method of conducting 
       an old business. . . . 
 
        . . . [T]he use of bank credit cards in consumer 
       transactions is a normal part of the banking business. 
       The challenged expenditures were for the continuation 
       of an existing business and for the preservation and 
       improvement of existing income. Hence, they were 
       ordinary expenses. 
 
Id. at 1192-93. 
 
In the case before us, the Tax Court distinguished these 
"credit card" cases, stating that they were inapposite to our 
fact pattern because in those cases, no "separate and 
distinct asset" was created, while in PNC's case, such an 
asset was created. As we have discussed above, we do not 
agree that the loan origination expenditures created distinct 
assets, any more so than did the expenditures incurred in 
entering into the credit card business. In fact, wefind that 
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PNC's situation presents an even stronger case for 
deductibility than do the credit card cases. In the credit 
card cases, the taxpayers were starting up new programs 
within their businesses, or at the very least, new methods 
of performing old tasks. In contrast, FNPC and UFB 
incurred the challenged costs in their routine selling and 
marketing of normal loans in the traditional ways that 
banks have been using for many decades.14  Thus, FNPC's 
and UFB's costs bear far more of the indicia of 
"ordinariness," and fewer of the indicia of"creating" 
something, than do the start-up costs described in the 
credit card cases. 
 
The remaining question, then, is whether either the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board's adoption of SFAS 
91 or the Supreme Court's pronouncement on deductibility 
in INDOPCO, both of which developments occurred after the 
decisions in Lincoln Savings and the credit card cases, 
would alter the calculus of deductibility versus 
capitalization in PNC's case. We conclude that the existence 
of SFAS 91 has little, if any, bearing on the appropriate tax 
analysis, and that the Supreme Court's decision in 
INDOPCO, while clearly relevant, does not change the result 
in the case at bar. 
 
The Supreme Court has held that financial accounting 
standards such as SFAS 91 do not dictate tax treatment of 
income and expenditures. See Thor Power Tool Co. v. 
Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 542-43, 544 (1979) 
(discussing the "vastly different objectives thatfinancial and 
tax accounting have" and stating that "[g]iven this diversity, 
even contrariety, of objectives, any presumptive equivalency 
between tax and financial accounting would be 
unacceptable" and would "create insurmountable 
difficulties of tax administration"). The IRS concedes that 
"financial accounting rules are not controlling for federal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. As the Tax Court decision that was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Iowa-Des Moines stated, costs that are "merely 
related to the active conduct of an existing business and [do] not create 
or enhance a separate and distinct asset or property interest" are 
appropriate for deduction. Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 
68 T.C. 872, 879 (1977), cited in PNC, 110 T.C. at 365. 
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tax purposes," IRS Br. at 28 n.4 (citing PNC , 110 T.C. at 
364 n.15), and states that "[n]either the Commissioner's 
deficiency determination nor the Tax Court decision was 
based on the provisions of SFAS 91," id. Although SFAS 91 
may have served as a catalyst for the IRS's desire to seek 
capitalization of the costs at issue here, and may have been 
considered by the IRS in determining where to draw the 
line between current-year and deferred costs, see supra 
note 3, the IRS disavows any argument that the financial 
accounting standards should dictate tax treatment, see IRS 
Br. at 27-28 & n.4. Further, as with the financial 
accounting standards at issue in Thor Power, it is clear that 
the reasons for SFAS 91's requirement that loan origination 
costs be deferred are reasons wholly specific to the realm of 
financial accounting,15 and thus those financial accounting 
standards do not affect our tax analysis.16 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. SFAS 91 was motivated by a concern that the structure of certain 
banks' loan agreements could lead to the illusion that these banks and 
their customers were in better financial condition than they actually 
were. Specifically, SFAS 91 was designed to address the practices of 
banks that charged unusually high fees up front as conditions for the 
closing of a loan (e.g., high "points" on a mortgage) in exchange for 
lower 
interest rates later on; these practices were known as "teaser" rate 
financing. See A. at 173. These practices"arguably allowed individuals 
to qualify for loans in greater amounts than they would otherwise be 
able to secure," id., and also overstated the income from a loan in its 
first year and understated its income in later years. The Financial 
Accounting Standards Board, concerned about these ramifications, 
therefore required companies to defer fees over the life of the loan. SFAS 
91 was worded to include the deferral of costs  only after industry 
representatives protested that it would be unfair to the industries to 
have to defer the fees they received without also being allowed to defer 
the costs they incurred. See A. at 174. 
 
16. In fact, we conclude that the IRS's wholesale importation of the line 
drawn by the financial accounting standards creates tax consequences 
that the Commissioner appears not to have considered. For example, if 
the loan origination costs were required to be capitalized, it would seem 
to follow that these costs would have to be included in the basis of each 
loan. Such inclusions would apparently be a departure from current 
practice. Cf. Rev. Rul. 89-122, 1989-2 C.B. 200 (apparently assuming 
that the bank's basis in a loan is equal to the money advanced by the 
bank, without any adjustments for origination costs). The calculations 
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Nor do we view the Supreme Court's decision in INDOPCO 
as requiring a different result regarding the deductibility of 
the banks' costs. In INDOPCO, the Supreme Court required 
capitalization of the expenditures incurred by the target 
corporation during a planned friendly takeover by another 
company. See INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 90. The Supreme 
Court was careful to emphasize in INDOPCO, as it had in 
Lincoln Savings, that the capitalization versus deductibility 
inquiry was heavily fact-based. See id. at 86 (citing Welch 
v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114 (1933) and Deputy v. du 
Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 496 (1940)). The Supreme Court in 
INDOPCO downplayed the importance of the "creation of a 
separate and distinct asset" described in Lincoln Savings, 
clarifying that it was not an exclusive test: 
 
       Lincoln Savings stands for the simple proposition that 
       a taxpayer's expenditure that "serves to create or 
       enhance . . . a separate and distinct" asset should be 
       capitalized under S 263. It by no means follows, 
       however, that only expenditures that create or enhance 
       separate and distinct assets are to be capitalized under 
       S 263. 
 
INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 86-87. The Court reasoned that, 
while in the Lincoln Savings setting the Court had seemed 
to attach limited significance to the concept of"benefit," see 
INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 87 (quoting Lincoln Savings, 403 
U.S. at 354), in the merger situation presented in INDOPCO 
a "future benefit" analysis was relevant and appropriate 
since the "resource-related benefits" to be reaped from the 
merger were of considerable importance, INDOPCO , 503 
U.S. at 88. In the INDOPCO context of a friendly takeover, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
involved would presumably complicate the transfer of loans from one 
lending institution to another. However, the IRS conceded at oral 
argument that a requirement of capitalization of loan origination costs 
would probably mean that these complex basis adjustments would need 
to be made. See Tr. of Oral Argument at 34. The IRS's apparent failure 
to consider these and other tax ramifications of capitalization suggests 
that the IRS's borrowing of the line that the SFAS 91 standards draw 
between current-year costs and deferred costs was not based on any 
independent tax analysis, but was simply a "bootstrapping" of the 
financial accounting standards into the tax arena. 
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the Court found that one key inquiry was whether the 
money that the target corporation had spent on takeover- 
related expenditures was spent primarily for a "future 
benefit" extending beyond the tax year, rather than for the 
needs of current income production. The Court stated: 
 
       Although the mere presence of an incidental future 
       benefit -- "some future aspect" -- may not warrant 
       capitalization, a taxpayer's realization of benefits 
       beyond the year in which the expenditure is incurred is 
       undeniably important in determining whether the 
       appropriate tax treatment is immediate deduction or 
       capitalization. 
 
Id. at 87. 
 
As was recognized in several of the "credit card" cases 
discussed above, these circumstances are simply not 
presented by a bank's credit-issuing activities. The Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Iowa-Des Moines, anticipating 
the "future benefit" concerns later stated in INDOPCO, 
emphasized the "short useful life" of credit information as a 
reason for deductibility. Iowa-Des Moines, 592 F.2d at 436. 
The Iowa court stated that the prospective future benefit 
that could accrue beyond the taxable year as a result of 
credit screening was "very slight," and thus capitalization 
was "not easily supported." Id. In National Starch, the 
decision that the Supreme Court affirmed in INDOPCO, we 
found that these credit card cases contained the seed of the 
"future benefit" analysis, citing these cases as evidence that 
several Courts of Appeals "look[ed] to whether an ensuing 
benefit was created to determine whether the expense was 
ordinary and necessary," National Starch, 918 F.2d at 431, 
and that these courts found that future benefit was not 
substantial in situations similar to the case at bar. See id. 
(citing Iowa-Des Moines and Colorado Springs). We conclude 
that the credit card cases not only continue to have vitality 
after INDOPCO, but in fact anticipated some of the concerns 
addressed by INDOPCO. 
 
We also conclude that the Tax Court erred in its 
interpretation of the "future benefit" analysis by relying on 
the fact that the loan itself was usually of several years' 
duration and by reasoning that the loan origination costs 
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were, thus, essentially directed at future benefit. The Tax 
Court stated: "While the useful life of a credit report and 
other financial data may be of short duration, the useful life 
of the asset they serve to create is not." PNC, 110 T.C. at 
371. However, that analysis depends on the Tax Court's 
earlier assumption that the loan origination expenses 
actually created a "separate and distinct asset." Stripped of 
this assumption, the Tax Court's analysis is not 
supportable.17 
 
In addition, we must remember that the "future benefit" 
analysis adopted in INDOPCO is not meant as a talismanic, 
bright-line test. See A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 
119 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he Court did not 
purport to be creating a talismanic test that an expenditure 
must be capitalized if it creates some future benefit."). 
Rather, the INDOPCO analysis demonstrates the contextual, 
case-by-case approach to determining whether an 
expenditure better fits under the "ordinary and necessary" 
language of section 162(a) or the "permanent improvements 
or betterments" language of 263(a). We conclude that the 
loan origination expenses incurred by UFB and FNPC have 
the characteristics of the former, rather than the latter, 
statutory language. 
 
As described above, the loan marketing activities at issue 
here lie at the very core of the banks' recurring, routine 
day-to-day business. The Commissioner has not been able 
to articulate a principled reason why these normal costs of 
doing business must be capitalized, while other ordinary 
banking costs need not be. Instead, the Commissioner 
relies on the line drawn by SFAS 91, a standard whose 
rationale we conclude is far removed from the concerns of 
the tax system. See, e.g., IRS Br. at 27 ("It should be noted 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. The Tax Court's "future benefit" discussion also reflects another 
problematic assumption, i.e., that the capitalization requirement is 
contingent on the loan's ultimately being approved. It cannot possibly be 
true, as the Tax Court and the Commissioner would have it, that the 
existence of a subsequent loan-derived revenue stream is the trigger for 
the capitalization requirement. (If a company were to undertake research 
and development to investigate new product lines, would it have to 
capitalize only those R&D costs that led to product lines that were 
ultimately successful and profitable? We think not.) 
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. . . that SFAS 91 itself, which the banks have followed, 
expressly distinguishes direct loan origination costs, which 
must be deferred, from all other loan-related costs, such as 
advertising, soliciting potential borrowers, and servicing 
existing loans, which may be currently deducted for 
financial accounting purposes."); Tr. of Oral Argument at 
27 (statement by IRS's counsel that "[w]here we draw the 
line is -- actually the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board made it very easy for us."). Similarly, the Tax Court, 
while professing not to find the financial standards 
dispositive, see PNC, 110 T.C. at 364 n.15, id. at 368 n.18, 
used SFAS 91 as the sole source of an explanation as to 
why these loan origination costs, but not other costs 
associated with the banks' lending business, must be 
capitalized, see id. at 368-69. We remain unconvinced that 
the line drawn by the FASB in SFAS 91 has any relevance 
here for tax purposes. 
 
The Supreme Court has noted that "capitalization 
prevents the distortion of income that would otherwise 
occur if depreciation properly allocable to asset acquisition 
were deducted from gross income currently realized." 
Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 14 (1974). In 
the case of the costs at issue here, there need be no 
concern about a distortion of income because of the 
regularity of these expenses. 
 
Finally, we emphasize that the key to the deductibility 
inquiry remains the statutory language of sections 162(a) 
and 263(a). See Erwin N. Griswold, Cases and Materials on 
Federal Taxation, at 15 (5th ed. 1960) ("There is no use in 
thinking great thoughts about a tax problem unless the 
thoughts are firmly based on the controlling statute."). The 
analyses set forth in INDOPCO and Lincoln Savings provide 
us with two applications of that statutory language. Like 
the Supreme Court in INDOPCO and Lincoln Savings, we do 
not here attempt to define once and for all a bright line 
between deduction and capitalization that will hold true for 
all factual situations. We can only heed Justice Cardozo's 
admonition that we should always keep the factsfirmly in 
view, as well as Dean Griswold's advice that we remain 
cognizant of the language of the Code. Resorting to that 
language, we find the case before us today to be much 
 
                                22 
  
farther from the heartland of the traditional capital 
expenditure (a "permanent improvement or betterment") 
than are the scenarios at issue in INDOPCO and Lincoln 
Savings. We will not mechanistically apply phrases from 
those precedents in ignorance of the realities of the facts 
before us. We see no principled distinction between the 
costs at issue here and other costs incurred as"ordinary 
expenses" by banks. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the loan 
origination expenses are deductible as "ordinary and 
necessary business expenses" under section 162(a) of the 
Internal Revenue Code, and are not subject to the 
capitalization provision of section 263(a). Accordingly, we 
will reverse the judgment of the Tax Court. 
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